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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we will present the findings, derived from a structured questionnaire, 
that cover various aspects of the relation between human factor and maritime safety. 
In general, human element holds a very important share compared to the ensemble of 
marine-accident causes. This fact renders human behaviour and performance as 
potential leading components in relative safety surveys. Moreover, it must be noted 
that marine industry is surely between the less documented sectors, as far as human 
element is concerned. Nevertheless, IMO is constantly aiming at an adequate 
incorporation of human factor in numerous of its actions and regulations. Hence, 
numerous key enhancements of human behaviour and performance could be regarded 
as possible future standards and specifications, for certain safety-driven procedures of 
maritime transport. Then, we describe and analyse an original human-related 
questionnaire, which focuses on depicting the current practice of human factor, 
mainly through the implementation of the International Safety Management Code. 
The specific questionnaire, which comprises of an adequate sample of interviews and 
surveys, is presented in detail, in order to set off all fields of included data and its 
corresponding potential for informative and exploitative usage. Thus, the selected 
results are clearly human-oriented and they assay to portray a number of human 
aspects (crew training, acceptance etc), relatively to safe management and naval 
accidents. Finally, we close this paper with some interesting and revealing 
conclusions, derived from the aforementioned process. This way, we plan to show the 
importance of human factor in the evolving outline of the contemporary marine 
industry. 
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Introduction 
 
The issue of marine safety should be regarded as the key priority concerning the 
planning and practice of maritime transport procedures, in a worldwide scale. Since 
the vast majority of world trade is being conducted through sea-borne ways, maritime 
safety should be viewed as a factor that needs extreme caution, detailed planning, 
self-commitment and obligatory enforcement. The term marine safety has a multi- fold 
content, with a serious impact on numerous aspects of the maritime transport chain; 
more specifically, it involves the aversion of human losses and injuries, the 
preservation of marine and coastal environment and the protection of vessels and their 
cargoes. Hence, safety topics are not to be simply pinpointed and addressed in the 
aftermath of a significant, or a mass media-adduced, naval accident. On the contrary, 
these matters should be dealt proactively, in order to provide for an efficient, profit 
making and environment-friendly maritime transport network. 
 
There are several causes that can rupture the aforementioned transport chain, with 
undesired consequences. This can be resulted from unsolved mechanical or electrical 
problems, hazardous external conditions (such as severe weather), poor human factor 
behaviour or performance (e.g. inadequate bridge resource management), accidental 
events (like an unpredictable hull problem) etc. However, it is a fact that human 
element is the basic and by far the most frequent reason that leads towards marine 
accidents (Ventikos, 2002). Each involved player (e.g. crew, shore management, 
classification societies etc) has been recorded as the responsible component for 
numerous verified mishaps, which could have been averted under different 
circumstances. Thus, the correct way to respond to casualties and exploit its 
knowledge potential is to analyse the “mistakes” (mainly human errors) that caused 
them and assay to prevent them from appearing ever again. 
 
The corresponding literature contains several examples than can depict the 
significance of human factor in relation to safe maritime management, even from a 
high level point-of-view. The case of the collision between the passenger vessel 
Noordam and the loaded bulk carrier Mount Ymitos could be considered as a typical 
example of documenting the involvement of human element in marine accidents 
(Atkinson, 1995). This accident happened near the Southeast Pass in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and both vessels were moderately damaged. The human errors that were 
pinpointed by the corresponding investigation were, the failure of officers on the 
Noordam to maintain a vigilant watch, the preoccupation of Noordam bridge crew 
with arrival activities and a certain lack of communication betwixt the two ships. 
Another similar example is the collision between the supply vessel Galveston and the 
Panamanian bulk carrier Atticos in the Lower Mississippi River near Venice, 
Louisiana (Atkinson, 1995). This accident resulted into the rapid sinking of Galveston 
and the loss of three of its crewmembers. The detected human errors were the failure 
of the Galveston crew to maintain a proper lookout (either visually or by radar), the 
insufficient time to adapt to the darkness and the failure to establish a proper passing 
agreement. 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed prominent activities 
(guidelines, circulars etc) concerning the combination of human factor with safe 
navigation and management issues. Its focus is primarily on manning, qualification 
and licensing (STCW 95); safety procedures (ISM, which is the chosen vehicle of this 
paper); automation design (integrated bridges, human-machine interfaces (HMI), etc); 
communications; organizational practices and structures. All the above, target to the 
amelioration of human interference, in the context of an enhanced and more safe 
maritime transport framework. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: the next section includes some findings 
concerning the involvement of human element in marine accidents. The following one 
gives a current view on IMO’s actions and guidelines regarded human factor and 
safety. Thereupon, the introduced questionnaire on human aspects – regarding marine 
safety and management – is presented in adequate detail. The penultimate section 
gives some original and revealing results coming from the analysis of the 
questionnaire feedback and the last one closes the paper with insights and conclusions 
on various points of the aforementioned topics. 
 
Human Element Statistics Regarding Marine Safety 
 
The effort of allocating various forms of human error as verified accident causes is 
surely not a trivial task. Moreover, this difficulty is augmented in the case of maritime 
transport, since the respective monitoring and documentation is usually lacking of 
adequacy and excellence. Nonetheless, marine industry can be exemplified from other 
sectors of industry (e.g. civil aviation, nuclear plants etc), where considerable load of 
attention is already given in pinpointing and revealing various involved aspects of 
human element. Accident investigators in these industries do not simply cover the 
chronic events of an accident from a high- level point of analysis, but they actually try 
to efficiently incorporate in each methodology framework, the human factor in all of 
its subsequent forms. In this manner, risk assessment acquires solid and complete 
settings that can ascertain for realistic and useful results. The following short list gives 
some of the human-driven causes implemented for airborne accidents (ICAO, 1987): 
· Failed to obtain/maintain flying speed, follow approved procedures, directives; 
· Unsuitable selected area for take-off, landing, taxing; 
· Inadequate pre-flight preparation etc; 
 
Therefore, human behaviour and performance can be the prevailing factors that 
prescribe the level of safety for numerous maritime transport procedures and practices 
of management. This means that they can also influence, in a considerable degree, the 
protection of marine and coastal environment. Thus, a feasible way to reduce the 
frequency and severity of naval accidents is, by identifying the contributing factors to 
the so-called human error, and by investigating for methods, which will either 
eliminate or mitigate these mistakes. 
Figure 1: Analysis by Category of Casualty, 1977-1991 (Tankers, 6000+ GRT). 
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Figure 1 depicts the distribution of tanker casualties per accident category, for the 
time period 1977-1991 (IMO, 1992). It is evident that mishaps such as 
Fire/Explosions, Contact/Collisions and Groundings, are mainly responsible for the 
recorded tanker casualties. However, this analysis is in no position to reveal the actual 
causes that led to the aforementioned accidents and to come up with conclusions 
concerning the active involvement of human factor. This crucial weakness can be 
remedied with the dynamic incorporation of human element in the process at play. 
Hence, both human errors and error producing conditions can be assessed formulating 
a realistic approach to the actual event chain that constitute each incident. 
 
A preliminary survey concerning the combination of human element and naval 
accidents is shown in Table 1. It must be noted that the implemented data are derived 
from the Transportation Safety Board (TSB), and they cover multiple vessel type 
casualties, for the time-period 1981-1992. 
Table 1: Analysis of Causes (including HE) for Marine Accidents (1981-1992). 
Cause % Contributing Cause % 
Outer Conditions 4   
Port/Harbour 2   
Navigational 
Reasons/Aids 
1   
Other (Vessel) 3   
Vessel “Hardware” 16   
Misjudgement (Captain) 11 
Misjudgement (Pilot) 34 
Communication Problems 10 
Misunderstanding 9 
Attention Problems (Pilot & 
Officers) 
23 
Human Element 74 
Other Human Errors 13 
 
Table 1 gives human element as the major cause for sea accidents, with a percentage 
of 74%. Therewithal, the problems of misjudgement (45%) and lack of attention 
(23%) are presented to be the most important ones from human factor point-of-view. 
The term “hardware” refers to vessels hull, main engine etc. 
 
In general, human error is considered to be the preponderant cause for the majority of 
naval accidents. Relative studies come up with percentages from 70% to 95% (with an 
average value of about 80%) for accidents in the maritime transport chain. Crew costs 
correspond to about 10% of the total running costs (Welling, 1995). However, it this 
specific ship-cost category that is usually pressed down, in order to “balance” 
economically each vessel. This can be interpreted into e.g. cheaper labour, smaller 
crews, inadequate training; all these are constituents that enhance the probability for 
marine accidents. 
 
Closing this section, Cpt. Ken Fullwood’s words are mentioned: “The well known 
80% of all marine casualties are caused by human error, is flat wrong. I believe 
human error – or poor judgement, which is the same thing – is a factor in 100% of 
accidents, or very close to it”. 
 
Current IMO Perceptions on Human Element: Visions & Guidelines 
 
As already mentioned, in the majority of maritime transport accidents, human 
behaviour and performance were the key factors that led to their beginning, escalation 
and conclusion. This means that the lack of various human-related aspects can and 
actually did play a burdensome role, regarding the various phases of a hazardous 
incident (Karydis & Vasilakos, 2000). Thus, it is imperative that all involved players 
should deal efficiently with the specific problem, aiming at the mitigation – if not at 
the prevention – of circumstances that foster the occurrence of accidents. 
 
Nevertheless, IMO – many times in cooperation with other units, e.g. the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) – tries to formulate an operational and legal framework, to 
find solutions covering the manifestation of human element, in management issues 
and accidents that threaten either the ship, the cargo, human life or the marine 
environment. This denotes that IMO implements various state-of-the-art techniques, 
aiming at an enhanced survey on human element; some of these efforts are 
sententiously and indicatively presented below. 
 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code: this is the international management 
code for the safe operation of vessels and for pollution prevention, which was adopted 
by IMO with resolution A.741(18) (IMO, 2001). Table 2 shows the ratified time 
schedule for the ISM Code. This effort scopes to apply structured human-oriented 
procedures (e.g. in management, documentation, training etc), in order to achieve 
enhanced safety for international shipping and alleviate consequent injuries, life 
losses and damages to the environment. So this Code poses human factor in the center 
of safety operations assigning to it what IMO refers to as “safety culture”: a self-
willing commitment for every individual to contribute in “safer shipping and cleaner 
oceans”. This paper mainly utilizes the findings from the implementation of this 
Code, as the proper vehicle to pinpoint and analyse various human-driven aspects, in 
relation to marine safety. 
Table 2: Ratified Time Schedule for the ISM Code. 
Vessel Type  Date 
Passenger Ships (incl. High-Speed Crafts) 1 July 1998 
Oil & Chemical Tankers, Gas & Bulk Carriers, Cargo 
High-Speed Crafts (all above 500 GRT) 1 July 1998 
Other Cargo Vessels, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(all above 500 GRT) 
1 July 2002 
 
Seafarers Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code: this was adopted 
on 7 July 1995, entered into force on 1 February 1997 and it constitutes the 
attachment No 2 to the Final Act of the Conference of Parties to the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(IMO, 1996). This Code comprises of 2 parts: 
Part A.  It is the mandatory part of the Code that describes the minimum standards 
that fulfil the provisions of the STCW Convention. 
Part B. It the recommended part/guide targeting to the unimpeded enforcement of 
the STCW Convention. 
 
STCW addresses the issue of crew competence. Hence, it handles matters of fatigue, 
training, survival functions, occupational safety, watchkeeping etc – e.g. Chapter VIII, 
Section A-VIII/1, Fitness for duty, Chapter VI, Section A-VI/3, Mandatory minimum 
training in advanced fire fighting etc. Furthermore, STCW provides for certain 
characteristics/qualifications for the corresponding assessors – e.g. Chapter I, Section 
B-I/6, Guidance regarding training and assessment etc. It must be noted, that the 
STCW Convention does not deal with manning levels; Chapter V, Regulation 14, of 
the new International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), covers this 
topic along with resolution A.890(21), adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1999. 
 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) & Human Reliability Analysis (HRA): IMO has 
introduced FSA, which is “… a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at 
enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine 
environment and property by using risk and cost/benefit assessments” (IMO, 2000). 
Under this perspective, the human element can be incorporated in the specific process 
by implementing HRA, mainly in Step 1 (Identification of Hazards), Step 2 (Risk 
Assessment) and Step 3 (Risk Control Options) of FSA. More specifically, HRA 
consists of the following stages (IMO, 2000): 
1. Identification of key tasks; 
2. Task analysis of key tasks; 
3. Human error identification; 
4. Human error analysis; 
5. Human reliability quantification. 
 
Hence, IMO proposes to quantify the relative contribution of human factor, in order to 
evaluate its realistic value concerning mainly the escalation of marine accidents. 
 
Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for IMO: in November 1997, resolution 
A.850(20) was adopted regarding human factor matters; this resolution is focused on 
human-driven activities concerning the safe operation and management of 
commercial ships, and the adequate protection of coastal and marine environment. 
The endmost vision of this effort, is to improve the performance and behaviour of 
human element, whereas at the same time it is aiming at simpler regulations, better 
dissemination of relative information, effective remedial actions, involvement of the 
entire operational spectrum (e.g. shore personnel, crew, shipowners etc), enhanced 
training, better working conditions etc. Inter alia, resolution A.850(20) attempts to 
record and handle issues capable to denote numerous Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSFs), which are parameters that can have either negative or positive effect on 
human behaviour/ascription; these factors may be experience, situational stress, HMI 
etc (IACS, 2002). In particular, HMI cover a very promising and significant area, 
which can ameliorate human behaviour, especially in cases of navigational problems 
and mishaps (also vide ISO 13407, Human Centred Design Specification). 
 
Human-Related Questionnaire: Introduction & Presentation 
 
The presented questionnaire was initially deve loped and utilised, in order to evaluate 
potential trends, perspectives and difficulties faced by companies – that is mainly 
from a human factor point-of-view – when implementing the ISM Code (IMO, 1994). 
 
The first phase of ISM implementation, as already known, started in July 1998 and it 
was the milestone for all companies, dedicated to transport dangerous goods, bulks 
and passengers. After 4 years of continuous updating of the questionnaire database, 
the gathered data were considered adequate enough, primarily to evaluate the success 
of this IMO instrument, in improving operations within companies. At this point it 
must be noted, that the working sample size comprises of about 100 company/ship 
questionnaires; this can be translated personnel-wise, into a rather rich sample, 
coming e.g. from crewmembers of tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo vessels, 
RoRos etc (mainly selected with port state control criteria). Hence, it is able to draw a 
general picture concerning the resultant improvement in maritime safety and the 
consequent reduction of marine pollution. The interest in the ISM Code and its 
achievements (including human factor, administration and marine safety 
amelioration) is justified, because of the deep concern of the maritime community on 
safety and management measures and policies. 
 
Prior to the detailed presentation of the aforementioned questionnaire and the 
subsequent analysis of its results, this paper describes sententiously the definition, the 
objectives and the provisions of the ISM Code. 
 
Thus, the ISM Code is an international management code for “…the safe operation of 
ships and for pollution prevention” as adopted by IMO through an amendment to the 
SOLAS Convention, Chapter IX (IMO, 1997). 
 
Within this context, every ship owner should establish a safety (and environment-
friendly) policy that describes how the various safety-management objectives of each 
company will be achieved. Additionally, this management manual should be approved 
by the selected Administration. The adopted policy should ensure the compliance with 
mandatory rules and regulations, guidelines and standards recommended by IMO, 
national administrations, classification societies, shipping community etc. Under these 
premises, every company should develop, implement and maintain a safety-
management system (SMS), which should include proper directives/guidelines, in 
order to ensure adequate administration, safe operation for ships and satisfactory 
protection of marine and coastal environment. In few words, such a scheme should 
comprise the following actions: 
· Provide for safe practice in ship operations and for a safe working environment; 
· Establish numerous safeguards against all identified risks; 
· Continuously improve safety-management skills of personnel ashore and on-board 
ships, including awareness for emergency situations (including safety and 
environmental hazards). 
 
The company must show to the Administration – or to any other authorised 
organisation responsible to assess compliance with the Code – that all of its policies 
and procedures are being implemented in a practical and harmonized way. Only then, 
the Administration can and will issue the Document of Compliance (DOC – for the 
company) and the Safety Management Certificate (SMC – for the vessel). Since July 
2002, all shipping companies are obliged to have SMSs in place, aiming at safe 
vessels and clean seas. 
 
Continuing with the presented questionnaire, it must be noted, that it was initially 
submitted – for approval – to the members/participants of the European Thematic 
Network, THEMES. More specifically, Spanish, Portuguese and French partners sent 
the inceptive draft to a few selected shipping companies for testing purposes. After 
receiving and evaluating the feedback information, the final version was approved and 
eventually sent out to a wider sample of companies all over Europe. 
 
The structured questionnaire comprises of five major parts (Martínez de Osés et al, 
2001): 
Part A.  Company identification data; 
Part B. Management; 
Part C.  External input; 
Part D. People; 
Part E.  Possible results from adopting the “safety culture”. 
 
More specifically, part A was intended to obtain information on each interviewed 
company, in order to set its input in the proper context; e.g. concerning the kind of the 
selected company, if it is a ship-owning or a ship-managing one, the kind of ships 
operated and the existing date of certification, indicating the quality and standards of 
the utilized certifying organisation. Some of the most representative questions 
included in part A, are presented below: 
· It is your company primarily a: Shipowner, ship manager or ship manning? 
· Which type of vessels does your company operate? 
· What is the number of vessels of your fleet? 
· Was your company certified by: Directly by the Maritime Administration, 
Classification Society or other? 
 
The second question was addressed, in order to focus on the type of traffic that the 
interviewed company was involved into, and then to quickly identify if the company 
was obliged to develop and maintain a SMS, at the specific date (prior to July 2002). 
The third one was included in the context of classifying the company by its own size 
and the last question was embodied in the questionnaire, so as to receive more 
qualitative and exploitable information, as far as the company certification status is 
concerned. 
 
Part B was developed to identify the trends and prospects “behind” the 
implementation of the ISM Code. It assays to shed some light on whether the 
companies have adopted the guidelines of ISM Code forced from the fact that it was 
made compulsory, or because it fitted into the company strategy and would have been 
implemented, irrespective of the circumstances. Part B also intended to find out 
whether the company was already ISO certified, at the time of the ISM Code 
implementation. 
 
One of the key questions of part B is whether “ISM implementation process led to 
changes into the company policies”. At this point it must be noted, that a significant 
number of answers to the questionnaire, were obtained from oil-related companies, 
e.g. D’Amato di Navigazione, Naftomar etc. Therefore, a critical mass of the 
incoming answers indicated that the implementation of ISM was not equivalent to a 
new line of responsibility. On the contrary, it led more towards a structured 
reinforcement of their safety measures and to an upgraded concern for the 
responsibilities inherent in every rank and functions of the shore staff and vessel crew. 
 
Another set of questions made in the context of part B, was in reference to quality 
systems, such as the following one: 
· Is your company also certified according to ISO standards (e.g. ISO 9000)? 
 
The intention for the above question was to know how many respondents wanted to 
take advantage from the compulsory application of the ISM Code and with some extra 
effort from their part, to acquire a certification in quality, in order to improve the 
commercial image of their company. 
 
Part C of the questionnaire, aimed at obtaining information regarding the support 
provided from the Flag States during development, implementation, testing, auditing 
and certification, as far as the application of the ISM Code, and the corresponding 
human element compliance are concerned. Questions posed in this part were in the 
line of: 
· Have the Flag States, where your vessels are registered, communicated any initial 
certification ‘threshold’? 
· Have the Flag States, where your vessels are registered, supported and 
encouraged the improvement of safety management skills? 
 
The recorded answers to this part of the questionnaire were expected to depend 
mostly on the “quality” of the Flag State, in which the ship was regularly flagged. 
Indeed, in the case of traditional maritime nations (e.g. UK, Greece etc), the state was 
supporting the implementation of the ISM Code, with the occasional aid from 
classification societies; whereas for flags of convenience (e.g. Honduras, Bahamas 
etc), it was the classification societies, the endorsed and authorised vehicle to carry 
out the necessary processes. 
 
Part D intended to obtain information on the levels and practices of training, both for 
shore and sea personnel; it should be noted that this set of questions are focused 
exclusively on human factor behaviour and performance. Hence, the questionnaire 
feedback for part D is extremely important for depicting the strong points, the 
weaknesses, the opportunities, the techniques and the possible improvements of 
human element. This part is very closely related to STCW 95 and its recorded 
implementation, in case of monitoring and evaluating the crew. 
 
The provided questions of this part of the questionnaire were formulated to 
investigate, whether ISM implementation and additional human factor issues were 
encountered, as a fruitful occasion to check upon and improve the existing 
qualifications of crews. This could be done taking into account, e.g. the quality 
assurance and responsibility distribution among the shipping company personnel, 
prefixed standards concerning human element behaviour, predetermined procedures 
for on-board operations etc. In line with the above, the following questions were 
posed regarding the measures and practices that were adopted by companies, in order 
to ensure the proper level of training. Actually, training can be handled as one of the 
main constituents of human factor performance, but at the same time, it cannot always 
give the desired results. Thus, the questions below can indicate part’s D generic 
direction: 
· Has the implementation of the ISM Code obliged to an increase in the checking of 
seafarer’s qualifications and certification before being enrolled in the company’s 
vessels? 
· Did new type of training for shore based personnel had to be established as result 
of the implementation of the ISM Code? – Could you specify the new type of 
training that was put in place? 
· Did new type of training for sea based personnel (vessel crew) had to be 
established as result of the implementation of the ISM Code? – Could you specify 
the new type of training that was put in place? 
· What new information is being sent to the vessels as result of the implementation 
of the ISM Code? 
 
Additionally, the questions of part D aimed at whether the companies, according to 
the spirit of STCW 95, had already developed some kind of private and 
supplementary training, or everything were simply driven by the enforcement of ISM. 
The key point is the determination of numerous shipping companies to improve their 
training standards, through a voluntary and highly efficient approach, regardless of 
IMO efforts to introduce ISM. 
 
In part E, the questionnaire intended to obtain information on any available result 
related to the implementation process, addressing human factor reaction, 
comportment and ratings. It is recorded that even though more than 4 years have 
elapsed since July 1998 (first phase of the ISM Code), it is still soon to determine and 
evaluate the real effects of this IMO instrument, mainly on human factor and 
managerial procedures. Nevertheless, there are some areas that can already provide 
certain and valuable trends and conclusions. Accordingly, this part targeted to obtain 
information on: 
· Number of accidents; 
· Number of incidents or reported near misses; 
· Economic effects, such as insurance premiums or costs of repairs. 
 
The comments coming from this part of the questionnaire were the most valuable in 
qualitative terms, because of the broad spectrum of possible answers for the 
interviewed companies and personnel. The provided answers were proven significant 
on depicting company results, practices, comprehensive human behaviour and 
consequent gained experience. Indicatively, one of the questions included in part E, 
was the following quantitative one: 
· Please give the number of deaths and personnel injuries, the number of 
commercial contracts, the volume of the company fleet, the number of vessel 
accidents, possible insurance premium bonuses and the number of reported near 
misses since the date that the company adopted its Safety Management System. 
 
The above question assays to evaluate any possible changes on various patterns and 
tendencies concerning marine accidents (possibly with human factor as a mishap 
cause), or any commercial benefits arisen from the implementation of a SMS. The last 
question of this questionnaire cluster provides an opportunity to each of the 
interlocutors to state their feelings and opinions regarding the implementation of SMS 
and its real effect on the benefits and difficulties of all relative maritime transport 
segments. This yields to a special focus on human element behaviour and 
performance, in order to probe, all interconnected causes and relations that lead to 
marine accidents. The rest of part E questions were addressed to investigate whether 
the introduction of the ISM Code improved the work conditions and load in the 
company/vessel; and to pinpoint any specific difficulties encountered within the 
working practices in the company/vessel. At the same time, the questionnaire is 
checking on the maintained communication between shore-management and the ship; 
this provides the necessary means for reporting deficiencies and non-conformities 
related to safety and management issues. 
 
Questionnaire Results: Human Aspects Concerning Maritime Safety 
 
The results yielded from the examined questionnaire cover an extensive spectrum of 
topics that actually can reflect numerous human aspects and various regulatory 
practices related to maritime transport. In particular, the questionnaire addresses 
human factor, either through a structured bypass approach, such as is the ISM Code, 
or in a direct manner, e.g. marine accidents, workload, working environment etc. 
 
In this context, the provided results depict a generic attitude of a rather large, yet 
“quiet”, number of respondents, particularly seafarers, who believe that the systems 
currently in place are generating far too much paperwork, and they are requiring 
additional administration and resources onboard ships. Nevertheless, an important 
fragment of them appear to be prepared to give ISM a real chance, even if they have 
already been overtaken by mountains of paper. Moreover, a certain number of 
individuals have used a very similar language, in order to allude towards the same 
consequence; that is the failure of relative efforts, if something is not done to reduce 
the paperwork and administration. Questionnaire data reveal that the filling of ISM 
checking sheets, is a time consuming task and most of the times done quickly, with no 
special attention to the actual process. The questionnaire also shows that seafarers 
have informed, their shore management, of the pressure that they feel, in order “to 
complete the paperwork within the time frame, under STCW rules” (Martínez de Osés 
et al, 2001). Hence as the answers manifest, this may resort to filling in forms and 
writing reports on watch, at the expense of maintaining a proper lookout and attending 
to the navigation of the vessel. Such a practice can be considered as a potential 
contributing factor to marine accidents that are usually characterized as human-driven 
accidents. Accordingly, Phil Anderson warns: “… this is not only an ill-advised, 
highly dangerous practice, but has to be the ultimate irony as far as the whole 
philosophy of ISM is concerned” (THEMES meeting, Brussels, Feb-2002). 
 
Many of the comments recorded in the survey, suggests that a significant number of 
seafarers, who perhaps started off with enthusiasm for ISM and other safety related 
issues, are now losing faith concluding that there is a gap in this area. Phil Anderson 
stated on this matter: “clearly this is very serious and we need to consider whether 
such a conclusion is warranted” (THEMES meeting, Brussels, Feb-2002). 
 
The above findings are depicted in Figure 2, which shows a generic view concerning 
the acceptance of crewmembers for the ISM Code and other novel safety-oriented 
initiatives. Thereby, according to the existing feedback of the specific questionnaire, 
only the 40% of the examined cases seem to be positive towards the guidelines and 
practices arisen from this IMO instrument. The rest 60% holds a negative position, 
mainly because of the extra paper work, which is time and cost consuming. It must be 
noted that the aforementioned percentages reflect the opinions of experienced and 
active sea personnel who have to deal with such issues on a daily basis. This does not 
mean that they oppose in any way, to the enhancement of marine safety, but on the  
contrary they criticize some side effects of the specific effort (particularly concerning 
its first years of practice), in order to augment safety and secure all stakeholders at 
play. From human element point-of-view, extra paper work can point to additional 
workload (which can mean fatigue, ennui etc), or even negligence of prescribed 
duties; circumstances that are able to lead to marine accidents attributed to human-
related aspects. 
Negative View
60%
Positive View
40%
 
Figure 2: Human Response towards ISM Implementation & Other Safety Initiatives. 
 
Howbeit according to the questionnaire feedback, there are ship operators, masters 
and seafarers who seem to have passed through the “pain barrier” and can see the 
light at the end of the tunne l. They are describing systems, where the paperwork and 
administration are under control, there is full support and commitment from shore 
personnel (company) and profits are augmenting. The above-described picture also 
indicates a substantial potential for future decrease of marine accidents that are related 
to human behaviour and comportment. In this context, Table 3 gives tentative, yet 
revealing, results on some basic human-centred causes that, according to the answers 
from the questionnaire, led to marine accidents. In general, the indicative figures 
included in Table 3 are in line with other similar efforts (e.g. MAIB, DNV etc), but at 
the same time it must be underlined, that the evaluation of human-related results need 
extreme caution and prudence. 
Table 3: Distribution of Human-Oriented Causes for Marine Accidents. 
Basic Events Percentage (%) 
Wrong speed & Incorrect use of radar 15,5 
Inadequate performance of Officer on Watch 32,0 
Wrong use of equipment 2,0 
Misunderstanding due to language problems 1,0 
Misunderstanding due to lack of training 1,0 
Procedural problems 2,0 
Incorrect decisions & actions due to stress, 
fatigue & training 
30,0 
HMI problems 0,5 
 
As it can be seen in Table 3, according to the presented questionnaire, the inadequate 
performance of officers on watch constitutes the most frequent type of human-driven 
marine accident; this failure applies mainly for the categories of collision/ramming, 
power grounding and foundering, in various types of vessels. It seems, that the 
introduction of STCW 95 has not yet resolved all issues concerning the proper way of 
watchkeeping, posing the implementation of STCW regulation/guideline, Chapter 
VIII, Section A-VIII/2, Part 3-1 and Section B-VIII/2, Part 3-1, Navigational watch, 
in question. More specifically, the most common violations recorded are the 
following ones: 
· Bridge unattended or under manned; 
· Limited visibility; 
· Unexperienced officers; 
· Officers non-familiarized with the vessel. 
 
All these components should be mitigated, as result of company policy, crew 
motivation and efficient regulatory regime. STCW provides a detailed list of 
watchkeeping duties and obligations, in the outline of safe vessel navigation. 
However it is evident, that the success of this task lies entirely on human factor and its 
aspects. Therefore, the element of motivation or the avoidance of tedium/stress 
situations for the crewmembers should be considered as possible ways out, with the 
desired results.  
 
Table 3 also shows that a very large portion of human-driven causes for marine 
accidents has to do with incorrect decisions and actions due to stress, fatigue and lack 
of training. It should be noted, that these parameters are allocated to all types of 
vessels and sizes, but they are mostly related with types of accidents such as, powered 
grounding, collision/ramming, fire/explosion and mechanical problem. Once more, a 
rather complete regulatory regime is not capable to fill the inadequacy of human 
behaviour and performance. STCW in Chapter VIII, Section A-VIII/1, Fitness for 
duty, gives the respective standards (e.g. 10 hours of rest per day), in order to 
eliminate the possibility of fatigue during watchkeeping. Moreover, SOLAS in 
Chapter III, Regulation 19 Emergency training and drills, and Regulation 35, 
Training manual and on-board training aids, and ISM Code in Chapter 6, Resources 
and personnel, and Chapter 8, Emergency preparedness, cover adequately the issue of 
training with multiple guidelines on the specific topic. Nevertheless in all cases, the 
key factor is again the performance of human element, even in the form of company 
management policy; motivation, training, workload, working environment, fatigue, 
stress-free situations, alcohol- free practices, attention, leadership etc are important 
constituents towards the enhancement of marine safety, from human factor point-of-
view. 
 
Another human-oriented problem included in Table 3, is the misunderstanding due to 
language problems; the specific questionnaire has recorded maritime accidents that 
were at least, partially attributed to such difficulties. This is another example of 
human failure leading to accident, even if the corresponding regulatory framework 
exists. In particular, the ISM Code in Chapter 6, Resources and personnel, provides 
for a common working language on-board the vessel to avoid similar problems and 
consequent mishaps. Only it is the crewmembers that are called to follow these 
guidelines, and make sure that such problems will not affect the safe voyage of the 
vessel. 
 
The implementation of novel safety-oriented schemes is in position to enhance the 
standing benchmarks of maritime transport, as far as safety and productive 
management are concerned. ISM can be viewed as a typical to-be example for the 
aforementioned perspective. Thus, the elimination of a number of known accident 
causes – related to the human factor component, e.g. extra workload, distraction of 
attention etc – may lead to safer and error- free voyages. Figure 3 depicts the 
questionnaire feedback concerning seafarer views on the number of vessel accidents 
in conjunction with ISM and relative IMO guidelines. The majority of these answers 
point towards positive trends; that is, at least the preservation, or even more, the 
enhancement of marine safety and consequently, the decrement of the number of 
vessel accidents. 
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Figure 3: Quantitative Trends of Accidents as a Result from ISM Implementation. 
 
According to Figure 3, seafarers seem to support that ISM has the potential to 
enhance accident wise maritime safety, in a certain degree. Inter alia, they focus on 
ISM, Chapter 9, Reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous 
occurrences, which manifests that the implemented SMS should ensure that all 
problems will be apart from reported to the company, thoroughly monitored and 
investigated, in order to improve safety and prevent pollution. Likewise, ISM Chapter 
7, Development of plans for shipboard operations and Chapter 8, Emergency 
Preparedness, are believed to pay an important role into vessel safety, whereas ISM 
Chapter 10, Maintenance of the ship and equipment, settles the maintenance topic in a 
structured and efficient way. Moreover, ISM Chapter 12, Company verification, 
review and evaluation covers all the actions necessary to uphold an adequate SMS. 
Seafarers perceive that the common point of all these guidelines is the allocation of 
responsibilities to shore (company), which is considered a rather fruitful step towards 
a realistic approach to the risk exposure matrix. Shore personnel should take their 
actual share of responsibility, in the outline of an effort aiming at safe vessels and 
clean seas. 
 
The negative trend in Figure 3 (15%) is based on the opinion of few of the 
interviewees, who seem to believe that human involvement in marine accidents can be 
increased, due to the implementation of ISM. These crewmembers feel that problems 
such as extra paperwork, augmented workload, lack of initiative etc will overcome the 
benefits from ISM and lead to maritime accidents. It should be mentioned that this 
type of answers were acquired mainly from European Union (EU)crews. 
 
The common belief should be that ISM can work and strengthen the safety framework 
of maritime transport procedures. It is in a position to aid human performance in a 
multi- fold manner, in order to mitigate its critical involvement in the vast majority of 
marine accidents. IMO and the rest of the maritime community need to look very 
carefully at what several shipping companies have achieved in this area. More 
specifically, they should focus on how they have overcome the paperwork and 
administration problems, and how they have motivated their staff to persevere with 
the implementation and maintenance of their SMSs. According to the questionnaire, 
shipping companies have increased the screening of potential crewmembers – based 
on their qualifications and certifications – during their enrollment phase, as a result of 
ISM implementation. Indeed, Figure 4 shows that about 73% of the interviewees state 
that ISM has ameliorated the recruitment procedures targeting to well- trained and 
motivated crews. The specific upgrade of sea personnel results to better human 
behaviour and performance practices and to the enhancement of maritime safety 
levels. 
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Figure 4: Enhancement of Crew Recruitment Standards due to ISM Implementation. 
 
ISM Chapter 6, Resources and personnel, creates the generic framework for the 
results included in Figure 4. The key point arises from its structured approach, which 
includes the corresponding STCW standards. This means that the implementation of 
ISM forces the shipping companies to document their screening procedures, in order 
to prove that they comply with STCW 95 (e.g. Chapter II, Regulation II/3, Section A-
II/3, Deck department: Minimum mandatory requirements for officers in charge of 
navigational watch). Hence, it is expected that the recruitment standards will improve, 
resulting to qualified crews on-board vessels. 
 
Another important finding derived from the presented survey was the contradictory 
views and perceptions concerning human element matters, between EU crews and 
personnel and those coming from shipping labour countries (e.g. Philippines, Ukraine 
etc). In particular, seafarers from economically advanced nations are mainly holding 
the middle ground, if not leaning towards a rather negative attitude towards the role of 
ISM and the consequent amelioration of human behaviour and comportment. 
However, when the opinions of other nationalities are also taken into account, then an 
enormous shift is recorded towards a positive stand; provided that all paperwork and 
practical problems can be solved, in order to diminish relative accident causes (e.g. 
distraction, boredom, etc). Thus, a significant cultural issue can be identified from the 
aforementioned observation. Masters and officers from western cultures believe that 
they derive from old, established shipping companies or traditions, where safety was 
already being effectively managed. To these people, this IMO instrument was neither 
wanted nor needed and has not contributed to increased safety standards or reduced 
rate of accidents – especially for the types related to human errors. On the other hand, 
it maybe the case that some of the “non-western” nationals, who do not come from 
such traditions, have found indeed that the ISM Code provides them with a good and 
sound structure to manage maritime safety; proving a de facto valuable and useful 
tool. Under the umbrella of a SMS, they feel that they are given a more productive 
and friendly working environment, while at the same time they enjoy the absence of 
certain human-oriented contributing factors to marine accidents. 
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Figure 5: Insurance Fees and Maritime Safety Scheme (ISM) Implementation. 
 
The questionnaire reveals that most surveyed individuals think, more or less, in the 
same manner, when the insurance premium is concerned; they hold a rather 
conservative stance regarding the implementation of various safety schemes, like ISM 
and the transition of insurance fees. Figure 5 shows the results that are derived from 
the questionnaire feedback, where it is evident that the majority of the answers give a 
neutral view for insurance costs in the maritime industry. Only about 13% of the 
questionnaires support the line of reduced insurance fees, as result of IMO guidelines 
for human factor and safety (ISM); fact that should be addressed in depth. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Safety is a crucial attribute relating to maritime transport; more specifically, it has 
many facets and it is difficult to deal with – even more in a proactive sense. At the 
same time, marine safety is considered to be indispensable for a viable and 
“attractive” maritime transport network. Its deficiencies can have an important impact 
on various maritime transport stakeholders (e.g. crewmembers, passengers, cargo, 
shipping companies, sea and coastal environments etc), as well with damages to third 
parties. The development of a full proof structure from safety point-of-view is 
definitely not a trivial task, yet an efficient approach should be configured in order to 
achieve the best possible results. 
 
Statistics show that the most common accident types for commercial vessels are, 
fire/explosions, mechanical problems, collisions, groundings and hull damages. 
Moreover, the pivotal cause for the occurrence of these accident lies on human 
behaviour and performance; that is on human element. Its interference can militate on 
various procedures and event chains, causing more problems and provoking 
unpleasant consequences, or on the other hand improving difficult situations and even 
preventing the escalation of threatening incidents. The term human factor is an 
umbrella that covers various human-related aspects, such as training issues, problems 
on watch, lack of concentration, communication problems, fatigue etc. Additionally, 
marine safety can be enhanced through management practices, knowing that a suitable 
framework can relief certain difficulties encountered in the maritime transport system. 
 
Under this perspective, IMO has issued several regulations focusing on human 
element and maritime safety; ISM is one of the most important of them. It was 
developed to enforce, through predetermined and established guidelines, safety 
practices on board ships targeting to the protection of human lives and the 
preservation of the corresponding environment. Hence, ISM is considered a prime 
vehicle to introduce solid safeguards and acknowledge useful practices for the day-to-
day ship and company routine. ISM addresses the responsible party for every task, 
brings forward structured checklists for every action done onboard vessels and 
generally creates a safety net for the sea and shore personnel. The key issue for a 
fruitful implementation of ISM is, the success of a well-balanced equilibrium between 
extra workload and safety motivation (safety culture) for crew and shore personnel. 
SMS should not allow, in any case, the crew (which could be stressed, under manned 
etc) to focus on the relative paperwork and not to pay attention to fundamental duties 
during a sea voyage, e.g. keep a proper look out, avoid a main engine black out etc. 
 
The presented questionnaire has to do with marine safety and safety management 
(ISM) issues, from human element point-of-view. Its development, in a structured 
way, aimed at presenting the true consequences derived from ISM implementation 
and the impact of human factor on marine safety. As already mentioned, the 
documentation regarding the involvement of human element in accidents (for the 
maritime industry) is poor up-to-date; therefore similar efforts should be viewed as 
useful instruments in formulating the generic safety component, in the outline of 
maritime transport. Recapitulating, the following findings from the specific original 
questionnaire can be highlighted: 
· Shipping companies have placed their attention mostly on safety-related aspects, 
such as prevention and training, which are mainly, if not exclusively, human 
factor aspects. Marine safety has been understood to be the main goal of ISM, 
dragging other related questions behind its wake. 
· The implementation of ISM has made documentation and report management 
much more complicated. For instance, the corresponding extra paperwork 
(justification of every action) has brought the crew to a boring situation, which 
can increase the possibility of marine accidents due to human errors; this is a fact 
that should be efficiently dealt with. Authorities, companies etc should not permit 
to some possible weaknesses of the SMS approach to overshadow its numerous 
safety-driven advantages; a crucial fact is that human factor can be adequately 
positioned in a broader maritime framework, in an objective sense. 
· There are certain cultural issues that lead seafarers from labour supplying 
countries to a favourable opinion for the ISM Code. The real reasons can only be 
assumed, but it is completely understandable that labour-force providing countries 
do not possess a deep culture in safety aspects; like within their educational 
process. Thus, they perceive SMS as a good guide of procedures and liabilities, in 
order to succeed adequate performance and enhanced safety. 
· In case of an accident, the use of ISM guidelines improves specific points of the 
action/event chain that finally concludes with the unfortunate mishap. However, 
there are a lot “deeper” topics, such as personal motivation, crew attitude and 
predisposition, or even the subject of crew honesty towards a necessary 
investigation, that still need to be addressed. Questions as fundamental as log 
book disappearance after an accident (e.g. in the case of the single hull M/T 
PRESTIGE) should be considered essential from safety point-of-view, and non-
existent within a proper SMS approach. 
· It seems that an important portion of human-driven marine accidents can be 
attributed to inadequate performance of officers on watch. IMO has already 
addressed strongly this matter with the introduction of STCW. Another big part of 
human related accidents comes from incorrect actions and choices due to fatigue, 
improper training, stress, boredom etc. Other significant human-centred accident 
causes is related to the improper usage of radar and the incorrect choice of vessel 
speed or to language problems etc. 
· The interviewees believe that the implementation of safety-oriented schemes, such 
as is the SMS approach, can at least maintain, and hopefully reduce the number of 
ship accidents on a yearly basis. This is done because this effort handles 
efficiently human factor issues and therefore, assays to neutralize a basic 
player/cause concerning the occurrence and escalation of maritime accidents. 
· The general view concerning the implementation of the Code is negative to a 
percentage of 60% of the recorded answers. This occurs because seafarers 
strongly believe that ISM is equivalent to extra paper work, inc reased workload, 
worst working conditions and time and cost consuming tasks in expense of marine 
safety. Whereas, the rest 40% maintain a positive attitude, pinpointing the 
numerous advantages of this instrument and conscious that there are changes 
taking place regarding the philosophy of shipping companies and the mentality of 
their shore and sea personnel. 
 
It is obvious, that the passage towards safer ships and cleaner seas crosses the sector 
of human behaviour and performance; the reduction of human faults should be viewed 
as the key achievement, in the context of such an effort. Fewer human errors can be 
safely translated into less accidents, fewer fatalities and oil spills and enhanced levels 
of safety concerning all maritime transport practices and procedures. 
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